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Review Essay
The War on Terrorism: The Big Picture
P. W. SINGER

“Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global
war on terror. Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading
more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are
recruiting, training, and deploying against us?
“Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next
generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a
long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop
terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against
the terrorists’ costs of millions. . . . Is our current situation such that ‘the
1
harder we work, the behinder we get’?”
— Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

S

uch are the big-picture questions for the War on Terror, the kind that should have
shaped Pentagon strategy from the start. Unfortunately, they apparently weren’t
asked by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld until 16 October 2003, in a private
memo that he issued to his top staff. While the media focused on his admission of a
“long, hard slog” in Iraq, contrary to the rosy predictions made earlier, the true surprise was that Secretary Rumsfeld questioned even whether we are “winning or losing the Global War on Terror.” He described how his office had yet to enact a “bold,”
measurable, or even systematic plan to win the War on Terror, despite being two
years and two ground wars into the fight. In short, what Rumsfeld’s memo admitted
was a shocking absence of strategic thinking.
One hopes that the “12-step” programs are right, and that admitting one’s
errors is the first step to solving them.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has expended an immense amount
of blood and treasure in the pursuit of security for its citizens and punishment upon
those who would do them harm. Yet while the US military has successfully overturned vile regimes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld’s internal
memo disclosed his frank assessment that we appear little closer to resolving the actual challenge that drives us, eradicating the group that carried out the 9/11 attacks
and preventing any repeats. While the United States and its allies have seized a portion of al Qaeda lieutenants and assets, the organization remains vibrant, its senior
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leadership largely intact, its popularity greater than ever, its ability to recruit unbroken, and its ideology and funds spreading across a global network present in places
ranging from Algeria and Belgium to Indonesia and Iraq. Of greatest concern, its potential to strike at American citizens and interests both at home and abroad continues.
After the Madrid bombings, some worry that its capabilities may even be growing.2
At a broader level, the United States and the wider Islamic world stand at a
point of historic and dangerous crisis.3 Perhaps most illustrative of the problem is
that what America describes as the “war on terrorism” has now become broadly interpreted as a “war on Islam” by much of the world’s Muslim community. Relations
between the world’s dominant state power and the world’s community of over 1.4
billion Muslim believers stand at question, with potential terrible consequences.
More than some lost popularity contest, the deepening divide between the United
States and the world’s Muslim states and communities is a critical impediment to
success on a breadth of vital issues, ranging from running down terrorist groups, their
leaders, and supporters, to the expansion of human development and freedom, whose
absence steers the next generation of recruits to radicalism.
In sum, our concern is not just with the Iraqi militants or al Qaeda terrorism
of today, but also a long-term issue of grand strategy. The United States may well
stand on the brink of an emerging fault line, or “Clash of Civilizations” as Samuel
Huntington warned, that could shape global politics for decades to come.4 Many strategic thinkers liken the situation to a long-term conflict, akin to the Cold War, much
of it taking part in the realm of ideas, but still with a decided security threat.5 If this is
the case, then from the Rumsfeld memo it appears that our leadership is circa 1946 in
its strategic thinking, still struggling to master the most basic of questions, who and
what we face and in what manner to respond over the long term.
Five recent books wrestle with different aspects of these important dilemmas. They nicely illustrate the varied viewpoints and perspectives that cover the challenges of terrorism and relations between the United States and the Islamic world. The
importance of such analytic debates should not be understated. The current debate
over what is the appropriate grand strategy or paradigm for the war on terrorism could
be just as critical as the arguments during and immediately after World War II over
communism and the Soviet threat, which shaped the next 40 years of US grand strategy
in the Cold War. Sharp diagnoses like George Kennan’s “Mr X.” article will lead to robust strategies and sound programs, such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan.6 In turn, weak analysis and political posturing will generate miscalculations and
failures, in the same way that McCarthyism and the misdiagnosis of the “Red Menace”
rolled the Soviet Union, Red China, and third world nationalism into one monolithic
and inseparable threat (unraveled only after Vietnam, with Nixon’s trip to China).
Princeton University Historian Bernard Lewis has been among the most influential thinkers in shaping the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 polices so far, having advised both the Pentagon and Vice President Cheney on how to think about the
Islamic world. Lewis’s book The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror is a
quick, post-9/11 follow-up to his acclaimed survey, What Went Wrong? While his
new book breaks little new ground in either analysis or research, it does provide an
easy-to-read general introduction to Lewis’s line of argument.
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Lewis finds the historical roots of the current crisis to lie in a uniquely Muslim rage, sketching the hostility from the advent of the religion to its global spread
over the last 13 centuries. In the current incarnation of this rage, Lewis argues, America serves as the Islamic world’s “archenemy,” replacing Europe as the incarnation of
Western greed and imperialism. The United States, with its values and policies, represents all that it is wrong in a modern world seen as unfair to Islam—from unequal
status in wealth, power, and success, to US support for the rule of tyrants in a region
left behind by both development and democratization. Lewis’s thesis describes Islam
as a doctrine that rejects modernity, in lieu of a more sacred past, and is thus placed in
a continual clash with the Judeo-Christian West. It is a simple, succinct, and thus seductive line of argument.
The book has serious flaws, though, and not just because it is really only an
extended essay. Lewis’s analysis is surprisingly ahistoric for a historian, glossing over
entire centuries and deep complexities. In a sweeping survey, he jumps from the Crusades to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as if they were one pre-established continuum, with minimal stops in-between. He arrives at this deterministic viewpoint rather
quickly, without establishing the underpinnings. Indeed, he accepts the radicals’
claims of being motivated solely by the events and wrongs of past centuries without
question. (One is reminded of the 1990s ethnic cleansers in the Balkans, such as
Milosevic now in the Hague, who pointed to centuries-past grievances as their justification, when they were clearly motivated by more current and often worldly interests.)
In making a fairly monolithic analysis of Islam, Lewis’s one-size-fits-all approach
risks misdiagnosis and clearly misses the wide diversity and great debates within the
Islamic world. For example, he often uses “Arab” and “Muslim” interchangeably,
overlooking the differing paths that Islam has taken in places like India and Indonesia,
where more Muslims than there are in the entire Arab world live under democracy, as
well as the differences within the Arab world, where one has both regressive autocracies in the large states and emerging democracies in the small states. Recognizing
these intra-Islamic world differences, and taking action to support those in the moderate camp and those who support our values, could be critical to developing a more
nuanced and successful policy. Finally, the book suffers from the fatal flaw of much in
the field, spending all of its energy in analyzing the problems, but offering little in the
way of solutions. Indeed, perhaps it is best for Lewis that the book ends far too
abruptly. Lewis’s pre-war predictions about the potential of the Iraqi opposition being
“capable of taking over and forming [a] government,” clearly were wrong.
Like Lewis’s book, a new book by the noted liberal thinker Paul Berman,
Terror and Liberalism, primarily avoids the present day in lieu of engaging the ideas
involved in the war on terrorism. Most of his argument takes place on the theoretical
plane, including through the works of writers and philosophers from other contexts
like Sartre and Glucksmann.
Berman’s ultimate conclusion is that our present enemy is actually an old
one in new clothing, arguing that the plagues of the 20th century are actually still
with us. This latest spate of terrorism, Berman finds, springs from the same sources
as Fascism did in the last century (in contrast to those thinkers such as Francis
Fukuyama who heralded the triumph of liberal democracy in the Cold War as the
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“end of history”). These same totalitarian ideologies have been planted in fertile
ground in the Middle East. Berman argues that, like Fascism, the ideology of al
Qaeda and radical Islam is driven by a fear and hate of liberal ideals of tolerance.
These groups reject the “hideous schizophrenia” of the West that attempts to divide
the state from religion and promotes individual freedom. Also reminiscent of Fascist
writings, the groups’ texts emphasize death as a purifying event.
Thus, Berman finds that the war on terrorism must be fought in same way as
Fascism was defeated, by beating back the radicals both on the battlefields and on the
level of ideas. His ultimate hope is that, unlike the liberals of the 1930s who rationalized the politics of the Nazi Germany, the liberals of today will face up to the threat
of terrorism. His equal concern, though, is that in confronting terrorism, we do not
destroy the very foundations of our liberal world along the way. This is an important
recommendation in a time of declining privacy, expanding police powers, arbitrary
detentions, and media spinning.
Berman’s book is thus an interesting read with a valuable point of view. But
like Lewis’s, it attempts to cover too much ground with little grounding and offers too
few tangible solutions. Berman’s greatest contribution, though, is an engaging and alltoo-rare exploration of the works of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb is the Egyptian teacher who became the major philosopher for the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 60s. His writings form the ideological foundation for most Islamist terror groups today. Qutb’s work
Ma’alim fi’l-tareeq (“Sign-Posts on the Road”) was reputed to be almost as prevalent as
the Quran in the Afghan training camps. Berman thus offers a useful analysis, with the
benefit akin to how military officers and intelligence analysts read Lenin and Mao during the Cold War in an attempt to get into the heads of communists and guerillas.
Richard Chasdi’s Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism,
1994-1999 is the prototypical book for all that is right and wrong with academia these
days. It provides a wealth of data and novel analysis, but packages it in a form that is almost inaccessible to general readers. Given the incredibly important and engaging
topic, Chasdi’s work is too often difficult to read and overly reliant on dry and sometimes distant quantitative analysis. Make no mistake, this is a book solely for experts,
but valuable nonetheless.
Building from his prior research work on Middle East terror, Chasdi lays
out a program that explores the victims, motivations, and methods of terrorist attacks
in the Middle East, and then connects them with the responses. His study finds that
economic backwaters, both at the state and provincial level, as well as instances of
failed modernization and unequal development, can lead to the formation and proliferation of terrorist groups. An absence of capable political institutions, as well as an
inability to deal with minorities in an effective manner, can drive terrorist activity as
well. In a sense, what Chasdi’s numbers are telling us is that failed and failing states,
as well as the lack of human development, do matter for terrorism. This is a key faultline in the field, so Chasdi’s evidence is important.
So while such quantitative analysis is often dry, it can reveal many interesting findings that are often ignored by policymakers and intelligence analysts. One
example is the often cyclical pattern of terrorist incidents. The research also finds
that across a distinct set of case groups, a counterterrorism strategy that is only
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heavily repressive tends to backfire. These include the use of high-level assassinations as a sole means to cripple an organization. Instead of hamstringing the organization, the research shows that it usually ends up producing splinter groups that are
even more actively violent and harder to defeat. It is a finding that the Israeli government can unfortunately now attest to, and one that US intelligence analysts worry is
coming true with the evolution of al Qaeda from a centralized global structure to a
more decentralized, regional-based network. Chasdi also makes an interesting foray
into the situational factors that lead to spin-off groups to emerge from terrorist
groups. In many cases, these organizations are far more dangerous than the original
core, but trace their lineage to catalyzing events that might have been foreseen or
even avoided.
The final two books under review here are by far the best. The first is Walter
Laqueur’s No End To War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. This is both an essential resource to understanding terrorism, as well as a capstone to Laqueur’s distinguished career. Laqueur is one of the foremost experts on terrorism, researching and
writing on the issue for the last several decades, long before anyone even conceived
that terrorism would be an issue of such import. He is thus able to make the historic
connections and grounded analysis that others lack.
In a breakdown of the many forms and causes of terrorism, Laqueur looks
at groups as varied as the turn of the 20th century Russian revolutionaries, who pioneered terrorism as “propaganda by deed,” and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, who pioneered the current wave of suicide bombing and other tactics. In doing so, he goes a
long way toward dispelling the prevailing conventional wisdom that terrorism, and
its suicide bombing variant, are of a uniquely Muslim or Arab origin. He also clearly
establishes both the continuity of terrorism as a phenomenon and the important differences between the anarchists and radicals of the European intelligentsia of the
19th century, the nationalist liberation movements of the mid-20th century, and the
more recent radical religious terror groups. Laqueur is also to be commended for the
extensive bibliography at the end, providing essentially the entire library of terrorist
studies for analysts and researchers starting off in the field.
Laqueur’s emphasis is on the multiple causes of terrorism (religious radicalism, political repressions, and even individual and group psychology). This can
leave the reader frustrated at times, however. Terrorism, like poverty, war, or even
the weather, does indeed have multiple causes, but that does not mean that it cannot
be answered or appropriate responses made.
The book’s closing points may be the most important. Laqueur finds that
modernity, rather than just democracy as often expressed, is the most important force
in defeating the present wave of global terrorism. Modernity involves more than improved material conditions; it also entails a transformation in beliefs and philosophies. While Laqueur believes that this shift is ultimately inevitable, the challenge
for the modern world is that it is still in a race with religious fanatics to see who can
influence the general population more in the interim. Unfortunately, the forces of
modernity seem to be falling behind right now, with potentially catastrophic results.
Perhaps most bracing is Laqueur’s pessimistic conclusion that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be used at some point by terrorists in this continued conflict.
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The strategic question that Laqueur presents, then, is twofold: The United
States and its allies, including those contending within the Islamic world, must find a
way to jointly support the forces of modernity both in the material and ideological
realms, while diminishing the power of radicals, including preventing them from
getting their hands on WMD. This entails both support for comprehensive political,
economic, social, legal, and educational reform, as well as a continued focus on pursuing terrorists and those who would arm them. In weighing these needs against the
Rumsfeld memo, it appears that we are doing too little of the former and have lost focus on the latter.
Finally, by far the most interesting and useful of the five books reviewed
here is Jessica Stern’s Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. An incredibly fascinating read, it follows Stern’s journeys as she seeks to understand what
impels organizations and individuals to use religion as a means to organize for violent
purposes. The book is filled with remarkable anecdotes that will grab the reader, from
her dining with a militant “Identity Christian” in his trailer park home to conversing
with young Muslim boys being trained in radical madrassas on the Pakistani-Afghan
border. As in Laqueur’s work, her meetings with radicalized mullahs, ministers, and
rabbis, who have all created organizations wedded to the concept that God has instructed them to cleanse society through killing, goes a long way toward dispelling the
idea that any one religion is predisposed to violence. Stern is to be congratulated for
doing what too few dare to these days, actually confronting the issue she writes about.
The ultimate finding of Terror in the Name of God is that in this increasingly
networked but still distant world, the most vulnerable in populations are particularly at
risk to succumbing to the sway of a charismatic leader or a deeply believed and holistic
ideology. These range from the abject poor to those who are dispossessed or disconnected in some way (such as the Muslim middle-class youth, with no job prospects in
broken authoritarian states, who make up the al Qaeda middle management). At the
core of the religious radicals’ doctrine is the creation of an “us vs. them” view of the
world. A complication for these groups is that their recruiting must target the excluded
and humiliated of society to be effective (as those who are content have no reason to
make the sacrifice of joining), but at the same time must establish its concurrent superiority to those who are presently on top. This usually leads to the religious doctrine of
avenging, where violence is described as a godly way to purify the world.
Stern’s best analysis is in her look at the multiple structures and organizations of radical groups. Like militaries, radical groups also contend with mission
creep, as what were originally religiously motivated organizations evolve over time.
Activity in the groups becomes a vocation, and both leaders and middle-managers can
begin to be motivated by worldly—including economic—rewards, a key point to target. Most highly organized but leader-dependent are the traditional “commandercadre” groups. However, we also have seen the creation of “networked” groups, which
have multiple, lightly connected nodes, working under the same ideology, but not dependent on each other. The latest are “lone wolf” operators, who are inspired by a distant leadership or ideology to carry out their own operations, but not linked in any
formal or easily traceable manner. As Timothy McVeigh or John Mohammed show,
just because they are individuals does not mean they do not wield a devastating power
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to terrorize. Stern finds that al Qaeda’s particular talent has been its adeptness at
welding each structure into a fairly cohesive threat to the United States, spread across
multiple levels and regions. Stern also worries (as does Laqueur) of the strange new
alliances that this networking can facilitate. One surprising finding is the startling levels of support for al Qaeda among other radical groups, such as Neo-Nazi and radical
“Identity Christian” groups, who celebrated al Qaeda and its 9/11 attacks for the attempt to strike a perceived shared foe. The potential of these links being activated
makes the concept of achieving homeland security through racial profiling even more
ineffective than it already has been.
Stern’s book is notable in offering a number of policy prescriptions. She finds
that key aspects of defeating such groups are to take away the power of the leader’s recruiting and justificatory tools. This means targeting root causes like the lack of human
development, political repression, and simmering conflicts like Israel-Palestine and
Kashmir; helping to support failing states and post-conflict zones that serve as havens
and recruiting grounds for their foot-soldiers; sowing confusion and dissent within the
groups and their supporters (one of the weaker arguments, as the nuances required
would appear to be beyond limited US intelligence capabilities); and providing alternatives to the problem of the often well-intended charitable assistance which such groups
often warp, both to draw in members and to present a positive face to their supporters.
For example, many of the radical madrassa schools that Rumsfeld’s memo mentioned
thrive not because of their terror links, but because they fill an educational need in impoverished areas of Pakistan and other Muslim states. An appropriate response would be
to shut down funding going toward these radicalized schools while also creating an active local alternative through the steering of funds toward more moderate ones, as well
as bolstering the failing public education system in such areas, which forces poor parents to send their children to these schools in the first place.
In sum, the American military has carried out a dazzling array of actions in
the last few years, but the Rumsfeld memo and the five books reviewed here concur
that its civilian leadership still has a series of complex and demanding decisions to
make in constructing a long-term approach toward defeating terrorism.
The writers agree sensibly that we must locate our policies on the side of
change, not the failing status quo. An important realization, though, is that the needed
transformation is not solely about short-term tactics or changing regimes through invasion. The realm of ideas is just as important as the material, so we must identify the
United States with the positive ideas, supporting prosperity and opposing repression.
There is a glaring need for the United States to articulate an overarching strategy toward terrorism that matches ends, means, and discernible measures. Part and parcel of
this is not the issuance of more policy statements that are simply collections of tactics,
but to establish a grand strategy toward the Islamic world that will shape our often disparate policies. The side-effect of building a cohesive, positive vision is that it will provide an agenda for our allies and friends to side with, as well as a program to contend
with the competing visions, such as those emanating from radical Islamist and other illiberal forces described with such worry by the writers.
In turn, the military must also begin to face the long-term challenge ahead
of it in protecting American interests and security. But this needed transformation is
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not just about precision strikes and gigabytes. Rather, a military structure that has yet
to enact the sort of crash course in Arabic and other Muslim cultures and languages
for its soldiers and intelligence analysts (as compared to the buildup of Slavic skills
across the force in the early Cold War), continues to stretch forces thin and deploy
them into roles that they were not prepared for (such as having artillery and armor
troops conduct counterterrorism raids in urban zones), and has a public affairs strategy toward the Islamic world that can at best be likened to an ostrich with its head in
the sand (reportedly, CENTCOM’s Public Affairs shop during the height of the Iraq
war did not even have an Arabic speaker on its staff), has not fully adjusted to the
changing strategic environment.
History ultimately judges wars not just by their immediate effects, but also
by their legacy. World War I is usually judged as a failure not because of the lack of success on the battlefield, but by its failure to leave much positive in its wake. World War
II by comparison is viewed as an ultimate success, because it heralded a new liberal
world order. History now stands poised to judge us—and Mr. Rumsfeld’s memo—by
the legacy that we are prepared to leave in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond.
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